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For a representative democracy to function optimally, citizens from all walks of life 
should have equal chances to express their preferences through the electoral process.  In 
practice, we know that the actual rate of electoral participation varies greatly depending on 
individual circumstances and social settings.  Better off, better educated, non-Hispanic white 
citizens are more likely to vote; poor, less educated, and minority individuals are much less 
likely to do so. Gaining a better understanding of why and how this might be so is crucial for 
moving toward a more democratic polity. 
Early voter studies showed strong correlations between race, income, education, 
growing up in an English-speaking family, living in owner-occupied housing, and being older 
with the likelihood of voting (Campbell, Miller, Converse, and Stokes 1960).  Though the 
evidence is not as well developed on this point, it also seems likely that geographically 
concentrating people who lack these traits further depresses their likelihood of voting.  Finally, 
the political system may have distinctive features (with an important spatial dimension) that 
facilitate or impede electoral participation, particularly by influencing whether or not candidates 
or parties seek to mobilize voters living in a given area.  They may or may not target political 
messages and other get-out-the-vote efforts on a given area; these areas may have a strong or 
weak political infrastructure; they have or lack other local institutions that facilitate electoral 
participation. 
Debate still rages about the extent to which the variation of turnout across 
socioeconomic groups may be attributed to individual characteristics, the failure of the political 
system to present individuals with salient political choices, or institutional barriers deterring low-
income individuals from connecting to mainstream political activity (Piven and Cloward 2000).  
Certainly, low-income, poorly educated individuals have often been able, given the means and 
reasons to work together, to cooperate to address their common concerns (Warren 2001 is a 
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recent example in the literature on community organizing).  It stands to reason that, regardless 
of economic resources, low-income individuals in well-organized communities will also 
participate in elections at higher rates.  Thus, contextual as well as individual factors are likely to 
be important in shaping participation rates.  And one key aspect of that context is housing 
tenure. 
Here, we examine the social and ecological basis of political participation in the 2000 
presidential election and the 2001 democratic primary and mayoral elections in New York City.  
We base our analysis on a unique data set that matches items from the long form of the 2000 
Census (for 2,217 census tracts in the city) to voter registration and election results from its 
election districts (5,787 existed as of the 2001 elections).  We are particularly interested in 
determining the nature and extent of the relationship between housing tenure and electoral 
participation, net of other socioeconomic characteristics. 
We know that home ownership is strongly and positively associated with political 
participation.  This may happen because homeowners feel more of a stake in a community, they 
receive property tax bills that directly remind them of their role in financing public services, and 
so on.  Much less attention has been given to renters (two-thirds of New York City households), 
or to the effect of specific forms of rental housing, including government-assisted housing.  Of 
these, public housing is particularly prominent and interesting.1 
There are good reasons to suspect that concentrations of government-assisted housing 
in urban neighborhoods will be associated with lower voter turnout. Subsidized housing, 
particularly public housing, shelters individuals whose incomes by definition fall at the low end of 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, the terms subsidized housing and government-assisted housing are 
used interchangeably to denote housing assistance for families administered by agents of the city, state, 
or federal government. We include project- and household-based subsidies, but exclude housing 
specifically intended for seniors and other special populations, such as the disabled, the mentally ill, or 
people with AIDS. Most of the analytical models we employ further distinguish between public and all 
other forms of subsidized housing. 
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the distribution, certainly lower than those within the larger private rental market.  Moreover, by 
concentrating female-headed households, adults who are less likely to have steady full-time 
employment, public housing has been roundly criticized for deterring its residents from 
participating in mainstream social, economic, and political activities.  
But there also reasons to expect the opposite, at least as far as politics is concerned.  To 
the extent that subsidized housing has resulted from community organizing, or is owned and 
managed by entities that encourage tenant organization, it may develop skills and norms among 
tenants that engender higher levels of political participation. Tenant organizations may in fact be 
political building blocks.  Certainly, organized residents of subsidized housing may offer an 
enticing “electoral market” for candidates, party organizations, and other political mobilizers. 
Research on the political behavior of subsidized housing residents should help us to understand 
which of these crosscutting mechanisms – the negative effects of concentrated poverty and 
demobilization, or the positive effects of social capital production and mobilization – might 
characterize the turnout levels in neighborhoods with subsidized housing concentrations. 
Here, we address the specific question of whether the incidence of subsidized rental 
housing – as opposed to private rental or owner-occupied housing – is associated with higher or 
lower levels of voter turnout, net of other socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, this paper 
examines the relationship between subsidized housing and electoral participation employing 
linear regression, spatial econometrics, and ecological inference methods. The construction of 
the data set, the analytical methods, and the limitations of these analytical methods are 
discussed in more detail below. 
Is subsidized housing a barrier to participation or a source of social capital? 
Scholars and social critics have excoriated public housing, and to a lesser degree other 
forms of government-assisted housing, for exacerbating the spatial isolation of the poor. Wilson 
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(1987) suggests that government housing has raised the barriers to participation for low-income 
residents in mainstream social, economic, and political life that already existed in the nation’s 
ghettos. Murray (1984) sees subsidized housing as one of many social interventions of the 
liberal New Deal and Great Society eras that contributed to the creation of a culture of poverty. 
Despite the contrasting implications, both perspectives lead to the impression that subsidized 
housing spawns a life apart, beset with dysfunction.  
Studies on the politics of siting government-assisted housing indicate that it has been 
placed in areas with prior concentrations of low-income households  (Hirsch 1983; Massey and 
Kanaiaupuni 1993; Newman and Schnare 1997; Rohe and Freeman 2001). Research on the 
neighborhood impacts of public housing also indicates that it is significantly associated with 
subsequent poverty concentration in and around its host neighborhoods, even after taking the 
prior locational bias of siting into consideration. (Massey and Kanaiaupuni 1993; Schill and 
Wachter 1995; Goering et al 1997; Carter et al 1998; Holloway et al 1998). And in turn, 
empirical work on the effects of concentrated neighborhood poverty has found it to be correlated 
with a variety of social problems including serious violent crime, juvenile delinquency; child 
maltreatment, school dropout, and chronic unemployment.2 
Few studies provide positive portrayals of public housing, though better and worse 
projects undoubtedly exist.  In particular, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), 
although the largest housing authority in the nation, has a reputation for being among the best 
managed, providing decent living conditions that are conducive to long tenancy and long waiting 
lists of applicants.3  Venkatesh’s (2000) ethnography of Taylor Homes, a large public housing 
                                                 
2 For the relationship between crime and concentrated poverty, see Sampson 1987; Lipsey and 
Derzon 1998;  for juvenile delinquency, see Elliot 1996 and Sanchez-Jankowski 1991; for child 
maltreatment, see Coulton 1995; for chronic unemployment, see Ricketts and Mincy 1983; for poor youth 
outcomes in general, see Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997; and overall effects of concentrated poverty, see 
Wilson 1987. 
3 Though Grogan and Proscio (2000: Chapter 8) call public housing a “social Chernobyl,” they 
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project in Chicago, portrays tenant-based governance structures which, at least for a period of 
time, managed to maintain social organization within the development and open channels of 
communication with federal housing officials.   
Turning again to local political lore, most NYCHA projects have tenant organizations and 
voter registration campaigns have repeatedly targeted them as places to enroll black and 
Hispanic voters. (The vast majority of those living in public housing are also citizens, not 
immigrants.)  With large concentrations of identifiable, accessible, and more or less captive 
voters, public housing developments are the object of recruitment efforts by politicians who 
would like to use them as an electoral base.  As  the field coordinator for two of David Dinkins 
mayoral campaigns observed, “public housing tenants in New York City are organized, they 
vote, and politicians who want their support pay attention to what they want” (Flateau 2002).  At 
the outset, however, we have reason to believe that a higher prevalence of subsidized housing - 
public housing in particular - is associated with lower turnout. The relationship between election 
district turnout and the percentage of its housing units in public housing and all other subsidized 
housing are depicted in Figures 1A and 1B, respectively. Both charts show clear, if slight, 
negative relationships. 
FIGURES 1A and 1B HERE 
How can we best measure electoral participation? 
In defining the outcome of interest, one part – the numerator – is relatively 
straightforward.  For every election, the New York City Board of Elections fields voting machines 
for the city’s 5,622 election districts, or precincts, grouped together in about 1,311 polling 
                                                                                                                                                             
say New York City's Housing Authority “managed for decades to resist the barrage of federal regulations 
that bankrupted and destroyed public housing in other cities, and continued operating a balanced, widely 
respected program. Today low-income New Yorkers will wait years for the privilege of paying slightly 
more for a housing authority apartment than for their current housing – partly because they find the 
management more responsive and the property better maintained than much of the housing available on 
the private market.” 
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places, a number of which are located in the community centers of public housing projects.   
These voting machines capture the bulk of votes cast; along with absentee and affidavit votes, 
they yield totals for each election district in every election.  Only those who are registered can 
vote.  Currently, New York has about 3.7 million registered voters, a figure that has climbed 
steadily over the last decade as the city’s adult population has grown and the naturalization and 
registration rate among adult immigrants has increased faster than the decrease of the native 
population. (Currently, New York has about 4,806,000 voting age citizens, suggesting about a 
78 percent registration rate.)   
Of course, different kinds of elections draw different kinds of electorates to the polls.  As 
Table 1 shows, Presidential elections tend to draw the largest and broadest electorates, though 
this has varied from 1.8 to 2.2 million votes over the last decade. Traditionally, gubernatorial 
elections have drawn the second largest electorates, recently in the 1.5 to 1.6 million range, but 
they were eclipsed by the hotly contested mayoral elections between David Dinkins and Rudy 
Giuliani, which drew almost 1.9 million voters in 1989 and 1993.  On the other hand, the 1997 
and 2001 elections drew much less interest from voters, weighing in at 1.4 and 1.5 million, 
respectively.   
TABLE 1 HERE 
Finally, Democratic primaries had, until 1993, largely determined the final victor in a city 
where registered Democrats enjoy a five to one advantage over registered Republicans, as 
indicated in Table 2.  The hotly-contested 1989 primary drew a record 1.1 million Democrats out 
to vote, but the subsequent primaries featured a heavily-favored incumbent in 1993 (0.5 million 
voters), two candidates who were evidently not wildly popular in 1997 (0.4 million votes), and a 
more heavily contested field in 2001 that nonetheless did not include a black or Latino candidate 
(0.8 million votes).  Since the primaries are more likely to feature candidates who explicitly 
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appeal to the heavily Democratic black and Latino communities, minority voters turn out at 
higher levels relative to the overall mean turnout in these elections, while the general elections 
mostly feature two white candidates, and the minority turnout is somewhat lower relative to the 
overall mean.  Finally, though gender is less frequently studied as an aspect of turnout than 
race, income, and education, it should be noted that New York City’s electorate is predominantly 
female, especially in minority neighborhoods. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
One way to approach turnout is to examine the number of votes cast in relationship to 
other factors, such as the size of the voting age population in a given election district, the 
number of noncitizens, the numbers with high and low education, and so on.  In such an 
approach, however, the number of voting age citizens, and especially the number of registered 
voters, is overwhelmingly the strongest predictor.  As a result, turnout is generally measured in 
relationship to some denominator, generally voting age population or registered voters.  (Since 
New York’s population is so heavily foreign-born, citizen voting age population is the better 
denominator. Recent studies of felony disenfranchisement also suggest that this is also an 
important factor in reducing the size of the eligible electorate in places like New York City, 
especially its poor black and Latino neighborhoods.) 
Because lack of registration is an absolute bar to participation, many studies use voter 
registration as the denominator for analyzing turnout, and we adopt that approach here.  It is 
important to note, however, that not all registered voters are “real.”  The Board of Elections is 
not rigorous about removing people from the rolls who have moved away or died.  Voter 
registration campaigns have also added a good many people to the rolls who are evidently not 
motivated to go to the polls and cast ballots.  Table 3, Year of Most Recent Vote by Year of 
Registration, suggests the dimensions of both these problems.  It shows that about 300,000 
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voters who registered and voted before the last political cycle of presidential and mayoral 
elections did not do so after 1994; these voters are most probably lost from the electorate.  And 
one out of five of registered voters has never cast a ballot, including 210,000 who registered 
before 1996, almost 250,000 who registered in the 1996-1999 election cycle, and 262,000 who 
registered for the most recent presidential and mayoral elections.  Thus “active” electorate – 
those who have shown that they are available to vote because they voted in at least one 
election between the 1996 presidential election and today, is more like 2.7 million voters, not the 
3.7 million registered.  An alternative to using registered voters, therefore, is to use “active” 
voters.  In practice, however, the correlation between an election district’s registered voters and 
active voters is .958 in 2000 and .962 in 2001, we will present turnout in the standard form, as a 
ratio of votes cast to total registered voters. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
What determines electoral turnout? 
Decades of research on voting behavior have centered on three intertwining 
determinants of electoral participation relevant to this study: the inherent features of individuals 
and the resources possessed by them; the individual decision to vote; and the social context of 
voting, including social networks and partisan mobilization. 
Early election surveys identified what later became axiomatic in election studies:  the 
poor, people of color, and the less educated are less likely to vote. These voting studies 
typically attribute lower electoral participation to a lower sense of political efficacy (Campbell et 
al 1960). More recent election surveys elaborate models of electoral decision-making based on 
the character and previous record of candidates and the salience of issues brought to bear 
during the campaigns (Miller and Shanks 1996). Although such studies introduce the possibility 
that the substance of campaigns may affect voter behavior, lower participation rates persist 
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among the poor, minority groups, and the less educated, which these studies attribute to 
depressed levels of political efficacy.  
The social choice perspective conceptualizes the decision to vote as an individual cost-
benefit calculation involving the (slight) probability that one’s single vote would affect the 
outcome, multiplied by the benefit of having one’s candidate in office, and adding in one’s sense 
of duty, but subtracting the cost of gathering enough information (including information about the 
candidates and knowledge of registration and voting procedures) and going to the polls. Since 
the probability that one vote would affect the outcome of an election is exceedingly small, this 
calculus generally boils down to the strengths of one’s sense of civic-mindedness or duty versus 
the generally slight costs associated with voting (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1973).  At 
base, then, this is also an individualist and psychological approach, like the first. 
A third, smaller strand of research focuses on the overlapping social contexts which 
inform political behavior and which may foster or hinder the development of skills and norms 
that translate to the act of voting. Weak ties like those found in the workplace or densely packed 
apartment buildings in New York City should foster political discussion, according to Huckfeldt 
and Beck (1994). Huckfeldt and Sprague’s research (1998) on the influence of churches and 
neighborhoods on political behavior suggests that neighborhood social interaction provides a 
vehicle for the transmission of political information and guidance. 
Finally, recent approaches have sought to synthesize these three strands of voting 
research.  Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) find that political participation requires both 
motivation and skills. They think that education and parenting provide the motivation to 
participate in politics, which the authors term “civic voluntarism.” They also find that 
associational affiliations can hone the skills needed for political participation (particularly 
participation in church activities).  We can extrapolate from this work the suggestion that living in 
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subsidized housing, to the extent that it involves or promotes participation in a tenant’s 
organization, may have a positive association with electoral turnout. 
One of three relevant studies examining the political participation of low-income 
residents has in fact found such a positive association: residents of state-administered tenant-
co-ops in New York City who participated in organizing meetings and who, through collective 
problem solving, successfully improved conditions in their buildings, were significantly more 
likely to feel politically empowered and to vote when compared to their counterparts who neither 
participated in meetings nor successfully improved their living conditions (Saegert and Winkel 
1996).  Two other studies, however, found something quite different. A study of political 
attitudes and participation in Detroit found that residents of census tracts where 30 percent of 
the households lived in poverty found that they were significantly more likely to believe that a 
range of political activities would be effective, but significantly less likely to engage in any of 
these activities. (Cohen and Dawson 1993)  Alex-Assenoh (1998) also found that living in 
concentrated poverty produces social isolation that leads to lower electoral political involvement. 
 According to Rosenstone and Hansen’s synthesis (1995), levels of political participation 
result from an interaction between individuals and the larger political system.  Like others in the 
individualist vein, they reason that individuals with higher incomes and more education want to 
vote because they are socialized with civic values. But they also focus on how partisan leaders 
attempt to achieve an electoral “multiplier effect” by directly mobilizing wealthy individuals and 
others who are believed to have influence because they hold leadership positions in social 
networks or organizations (such as the socially well-connected, long-term residents, or church 
or union leaders).  This model suggests that political elites might seek to mobilize long-term 
residents and tenant organization leaders in subsidized housing developments to achieve such 
a multiplier effect. Or conversely, as Cohen and Dawson found in Detroit (1993), it could 
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suggest that people living in concentrated poverty, including subsidized housing residents, are 
effectively shut out of the electoral process because they are not targets of electoral 
mobilization. 
As briefly described above, the New York City experience and the academic literature 
suggest that different kinds of elections elicit different kinds of electorates, with the rate of voting 
and the composition of the electorate varying across geography.  Clearly, presidential, mayoral, 
or legislative elections may be expected to activate different groups (and different places).  
Although national turnout rates have been declining since 1960 (Rosenstone and Hansen 
1995), presidential general elections involve the largest expenditure of funds by candidates and 
parties, the most media attention, the greatest public interest, and, hence, the greatest 
participation.  According to the official recapitulation, 105,594,024 people turned out to vote in 
the 2000 presidential election, or 54 percent of the 195.3 million voting age citizens (no national 
figures are kept on the total number of registered voters.)  This was up slightly from the 97 
million votes cast in the 1996 presidential election.  (In New York City, as noted above, 
2,280,429 votes were cast in the presidential election, roughly 47.5 percent of the estimated 
4,807,000 voting age citizens.)  Lesser elections, such as for governor or the off-year House 
elections, elicit smaller electorates (only 66.6 million for the Congressional elections of 1998).   
Similarly, municipal elections, held in odd years off the federal election cycle, often as 
nonpartisan races, tend to elicit even smaller electorates; in municipal off-years, when city 
councils are elected, participation plummets further. 
From the overall literature, therefore, we can expect to find the following relationships in 
our New York City data.  From the individual-level studies, we would expect that Hispanics and 
Asians turn out at a lower rate than whites; that lower income individuals and renters turn out 
less than higher income individuals and homeowners; and that poorly educated people are less 
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likely to vote than highly educated ones.  From the more contextual studies, we would expect 
that neighborhoods with more residential stability, and perhaps also residential density, would 
turn out at higher levels than neighborhoods with more turnover; certainly, we would expect 
neighborhoods where English is predominant, and where more residents are natives and 
citizens, to turn out more highly than neighborhoods where many people speak other languages 
and are noncitizen immigrants.  We also expect a negative effect from concentrated poverty.  As 
to housing tenure, our initial expectation is ambiguous: it could be that government-assisted 
housing concentrates poverty and social dysfunction, but it could also be that it fosters tenant 
organization.  Regardless of the general relationship between government-assisted housing 
tenure and electoral participation, given the greater higher percentage of people of color voting 
in Democratic primaries as a rule, we expect to find a more positive relationship in the Mayoral 
primary than in either of the two general elections. To find out whether and how these expected 
relationships hold, let us turn to the data.   
The data set and its elements 
As previously stated, our data set matches information from the New York City Board of 
Elections (which reported election results and voter registration for 5,662 election districts in 
2001), the 2000 Census Summary File 3 (long form data collected for 2,217 Census Tracts), 
and a file compiled at the CUNY Center for Urban Research containing 18,080 addresses of 
most government-supported housing projects (including federal and state-funded public 
housing, the federal Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation program, federal 
Section 236 units, the city's own construction and rehabilitation programs, and units receiving 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC)) as well as tract-centroid point locations for holders of 
Section 8 certificates and vouchers throughout the city.  Figure 2 illustrates the spatial 
distribution of public and all other subsidized buildings; Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the frequency 
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distribution of subsidized buildings and units, respectively (excluding Section 8 certificates and 
vouchers).  Note that public housing accounts for 24 percent of the buildings and 38 percent of 
the units of government-assisted low rent housing in New York City.  In other words, most public 
housing units are in large buildings compared to the other programs; Section 236 and Section 8 
New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation units are also in relatively large buildings 
compared to the other programs.  
FIGURES 2 THROUGH 4 HERE 
Below, we discuss the development of the three analytical methods we used to 
determine the extent of the association between turnout and subsidized housing, controlling for 
other socioeconomic characteristics. First, we conduct a series of multivariate weighted least 
squares (WLS) models incorporating as predictors measures of individual- and neighborhood-
level characteristics in addition to percent public and other subsidized housing. We then 
introduce spatial regression techniques used to test and control for the effects of turnout in 
neighboring election districts. Finally, the results of ecological inference models are presented to 
assess whether the aggregated results may be appropriately generalized to the individual level. 
The least squares regression models are weighted by the number of registered voters in 
each election district during the relevant election for both substantive and statistical reasons.  
First, we are more interested in the average voter than in the average election district, which 
vary greatly in number of voters they contain.  Since it is the margin in overall vote, not the 
number of election districts won, that determines election outcomes, election districts with larger 
populations clearly have a greater impact on electoral outcomes. Second, analyses conducted 
following initial ordinary least squares analysis (OLS) revealed error terms that were highly 
correlated with the size of the electorate in each district. 
Our three dependent variables are turnout rates for the 2000 presidential election, the 
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2001 Democratic mayoral primary, and the 2001 mayoral election.  As explained above, all are 
measured by the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters in each 
district.  (For a sense of how turnout distributions play across New York City, see Figures 5 
through 7.) 
FIGURES 5 THROUGH 7 HERE 
We first selected 27 demographic variables measuring social and neighborhood factors 
that we expected, from the election studies reviewed above, to explain much of the variation in 
voter turnout.  (The measures are expressed as percentages of the election district population 
unless otherwise noted).  We began with measures of race and Hispanic ethnicity; the 
prevalence of immigrants, their time of arrival in the United States, and citizenship status; 
income distribution, median and per capita income, poverty, and labor force participation; rates 
of college education and high school drop outs for the 18-24 population and everyone 25 or 
older; household composition, family form, and relation of children to working parents; 
population density, number of units in buildings, and home ownership status. 
We then determined that high levels of bivariate and partial correlation existed among 
many of these potential independent variables, making it difficult to isolate their respective 
independent effects through a traditional regression approach.  We conducted principal 
components analysis to distinguish the latent constructs represented by the 27 measures and to 
attempt to resolve the multicollinearity problem.  Six components were extracted, representing 
poverty, new immigration, population density, predominance of persons over 65 years of age, 
percentage of the voting age population that is Hispanic/Latino, and living in institutional group 
quarters (for example, a jail or juvenile facility). 
We compared three models, using as predictors: 1) the six factor scores; 2) six summed 
scales formed with variables loading at 0.60 and higher on each component; and 3) indicator 
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variables with the highest loadings on each component. With respect to preserving construct 
validity, the factor scores, summed scales, and indicator variables were highly correlated with 
one another (mean r =.62; p<.001). With respect to reducing collinearity (assessed through 
variance inflation factors), the model with orthogonal factor scores performed best, as would be 
expected, followed by the indicator variables, and then the summed scales; but none of the 
models yielded variance inflation factors greater than 3.3. With respect to the overall variance 
explained and the specific results produced, however, the results of the three methods were 
virtually indistinguishable. We chose to run the models with the individual indicator variables, for 
ease of interpretation since most predictors and all dependent variables are measured as 
percentages. In the end, seven predictors – in addition to public housing and all other forms of 
subsidized housing – were selected. Table 4 contains descriptive statistics for all of the 
variables included in the WLS regression models.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
For each election, the results of four WLS regression models are presented below 
(designated Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Tables 5, 6, and 7). The first WLS models (Model 1) control 
for two indicators of the prevalence of people eligible to participate in elections (percent of the 
population born outside of the U.S. and living in institutional group quarters) and four measures 
of demographic characteristics selected through the method described above (percent of people 
living in households with incomes below the poverty level, percent of units in buildings with 10 or 
more units, percent of population aged 65 or older, and percent of the voting age population that 
is Hispanic/Latino). Note that institutional group quarters are fairly rare in New York City (the 
mean is only 0.8 percent), and do not hold much of the city’s population, but they can have a 
significant impact where they are located. The typical election district has a sizable foreign-born 
population and the variation in the foreign-born population is considerable (mean=33.5; 
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standard deviation=16.4).  Similarly, poverty, percentage of units in buildings with 10 or more 
units (an indicator of population density), the elderly proportion, and the college-educated 
proportions are substantial and vary considerably. 
The second WLS model (Model 2 in Tables 5, 6, and 7) introduces the main subsidized 
housing variable of interest: the share of an election district’s dwelling units in public housing 
(mean of 6.2 percent and standard deviation of 21.0).  The third model (Model 3) also includes 
the percentage of dwelling units that are in any other subsidized housing, including Section 236, 
Section 8 new construction and substantial rehab, the City's Ten Year Housing Plan, and 
smaller and more dispersed programs of Section 8 vouchers and certificates and the LIHTC 
units (mean=9.0; SD=19.5). The fourth WLS model includes the distance from each ED centroid 
to the nearest polling place in hundredths of a mile (52.8 feet), to control for the effects of the 
proximity of the polling place – 21 percent of which are within 105 feet of public housing 
developments – on turnout. 
Spatial and ecological models were conducted to address two important limitations of 
standard least-squares regression methods. First, standard regression assumes the 
independence of each observation. We suspect, however, that electoral participation is an 
inherently spatial process: what happens in one election district is likely to affect what happens 
in its neighbors. For example, active political clubs probably mobilize voters beyond the 
boundaries of the election districts in which they are located. Such “spillover” introduces spatial 
autocorrelation into standard regression models. Left unestimated, spatial autocorrelation 
potentially results in biased estimates and misleading tests of statistical significance (Anselin 
1999; Galster, Smith, and Tatian 1999; Bailey and Gattrell 1995).  As a remedy, we specify a 
spatial lag model in which the weighted average of turnout in bordering election districts is 
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added to the model as an independent variable.  The results of the spatial lag models, including 
parameter estimates of the spatial lags, are shown in the final columns of Tables 5 through 7.  
Second, this is an analysis of ecological data which, as has long been known, poses the 
threat of estimating seriously wrong coefficients for the independent variables relative to what 
the underlying individual behavior might be (Robinson 1950, King 1997).  In the linear 
regression, we examine the aggregate relationship between the extent of public and other 
subsidized housing and voter turnout across election districts, which may not be an accurate 
reflection of whether the residents of public or other subsidized housing themselves are more or 
less likely to vote. As a result, we cannot be certain that any effects we might discover at the 
election district level will hold true at the individual level, or might instead be attributed to the 
behavior of those who live within the election districts but outside of the projects.  King (1997) 
has proposed a promising approach to resolving this problem. In Table 8, we report the 
aggregate turnout predictions generated by ecological regression for residents of public 
housing, all other subsidized housing, and all subsidized housing for all three elections.4 
Results 
A first observation to draw from Model 1 is that basic demographic factors shape turnout 
in the ways predicted by the individual-level studies of electoral participation – particularly in the 
two general elections (Tables 5 and 7).  The incidence of poverty is strongly associated with 
lower turnout: a one percentage point increase in the poverty rate is associated with the 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, King’s method is not exploited to its full extent in this analysis. First, although 
turnout is an aggregate of an individual-level measure, subsidized housing tenure is measured at the 
household level. To derive a more accurate estimate, we would need to measure the number of 
individuals in each housing category. Second, King’s most basic model employed here allows the 
inclusion of only one dichotomous independent variable. While we believe that it is critical to take a 
multivariate approach to control for the socioeconomic composition of election districts, we do not 
undertake here the computationally intensive second-stage analysis (Adolph and King 2003; Adolph, 
King, Herron, and Shotts 2002; Herron and Shotts 2003). Nor have we attempted to include a three-way 
measurement of housing tenure (e.g., public, other subsidized, private housing), which may be introduced 
in an extension to the basic model. These methods may be applied in a subsequent version of this paper. 
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reduction in the 2000 general turnout of 0.51 percent, 0.19 percent in the 2001 primary, and .45 
percent in the 2001 mayoral general election.  A range of one standard deviation above and 
below the mean poverty level amounts roughly to a 12-point turnout difference in the general 
elections.  As Schattschneider once noted, the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that “the chorus 
sings with a strong upper class accent” (Schattschneider 1960: 34-35). Smaller though 
significant negative effects on turnout are also found for the Hispanic voting-age population and 
persons living in institutional group quarters.  
TABLES 5 THROUGH 7 HERE 
Second, the results of Model 1 in Table 6 (the 2001 Democratic mayoral primary), 
provides a contrast to those in Tables 5 and 7 (the general elections).  The basic demographic 
model explains less than half as much of the overall variation in primary turnout than either of 
the two general elections.  Specifically, poverty, the independent variable with the largest 
depressing impact on turnout, has less than a third of the explanatory power for the primary. In 
this sense, primary elections are significantly more egalitarian than general elections, even if far 
fewer people participate.  Put another way, primaries interest poorer voters more (or disinterest 
them less) than do general elections.  
In the standard regression, a prevalence of Hispanics among the voting age population 
had a positive effect on Democratic Primary turnout, while it had a negative effect on turnout in 
the two general elections. When the spatial lag is introduced in the 2001 primary model, 
however, the association disappears altogether. While this may be partly attributed to a greater 
prevalence of Hispanic voters in the primary electorate, it is far more likely that the candidacy of 
Fernando Ferrer in the primary sparked the interest of Hispanic voters so that they turned out to 
vote at rates equivalent to the remainder of the population. Controversial events leading to 
Ferrer’s loss to Green in the runoff election undoubtedly brought Latino turnout in the 
Government-Assisted Housing and Electoral Participation   
 
 19 
subsequent 2001 mayoral general election back to a lower level. 
Similarly, there is a stark contrast between the slight negative effect of the elderly 
proportion on presidential turnout and the strong positive effect of the elderly proportion on the 
mayoral elections. When the spatial lag is introduced into the model, the net effect of the elderly 
proportion on presidential turnout disappears altogether. This is an unexpected finding, since 
the elderly are believed to turn out in greater numbers than other age groups in general.  In our 
estimation, the most likely interpretation takes into account the transformation of New York 
City’s elderly population from predominantly white-ethnic to a growing percentage who are black 
and Latino. If this is so, then the lack of association between the senior population and 
presidential turnout is probably due to the relative lack of interest in the general election among 
people of color, also borne out by the effect of the Hispanic voting-age population.  
A third observation is that factors never considered by individualist approaches to 
understanding turnout clearly play an important role.  Both population density and the proportion 
of eligible people within the population have a strong relationship to turnout in all three elections 
and the positive association persists even after the spatial lag is introduced into the model. 
Much more needs to be learned about why this is so, but it is reasonable to believe that density 
and the prevalence of eligible voters create a positive neighborhood effect on turnout on the one 
hand, and draw the attention of political mobilizers on the other.  People living in larger 
apartment buildings are more likely to encounter their neighbors and perhaps more likely to 
discuss politics and elections with them. These residents are also more likely to be the targets 
of voter-canvassing and get-out-the-vote efforts from political campaigns, since so many people 
can be found in one place, improving the efficiency of such efforts.  Similarly, candidates and 
campaigns, not to speak of the media, will aim their messages at places where most people are 
likely to be able to act on them, and people who have mostly other eligible citizens around them 
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are more likely to be interested in local elections.  Conversely, people who have less contact 
with their neighbors and people in immigrant neighborhoods are less likely to be mobilized by 
candidates.  Such contextual effects deserve much greater attention from scholars interested in 
political participation, particularly in the immigration gateway cities of the United States. 
Finally, we turn to the question that initially motivated our research: do neighborhoods 
with a greater prevalence of subsidized have higher turnout rates, ceteris paribus, than those 
with less or no public housing?  Our investigation consistently confirms that the slight negative 
relationship observed between public housing (Figure 1A) and electoral participation holds even 
after applying all of the demographic, contextual, and spatial controls.  The effect is ever so 
slight, but it is consistently and statistically significantly negative.  
The one area where the incidence of subsidized housing does not have a negative effect 
concerns the role of housing other than public housing. Other subsidized housing had no effect 
on turnout in the 2001 Democratic primary in the standard regression models, and a significantly 
positive effect in the spatial regression model.  Primary candidates Green and Ferrer were 
probably more effective at drawing voters from a lower income bracket than were Bloomberg, 
Gore, or Bush, and subsidized housing residents may have been specifically mobilized during 
this election. When the discrete housing programs are entered into the model in place of the 
“all-other-subsidized-housing” approach (not shown), election districts with more units in the 
Mayor’s Ten-Year Housing Program are positively associated with primary turnout (although 
Section 8, Section 236, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit units are not). While it is possible 
that there are unmeasured differences in the individual characteristics of the residents of the 
various housing subsidy programs, such differences are likely to be negligible. Another more 
likely explanation is that something occurred in election districts with Ten-Year Plan units that 
mitigated the otherwise depressive effects of subsidized housing on turnout. Many community 
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development corporations that developed Ten-Year Plan units are also known for their local 
political connections. Perhaps these organizations provided a channel for the electoral 
mobilization of subsidized housing residents.  
Finally, we turn to the spatial predictors of turnout. First, we introduced distance to 
polling place to control for the possibility that such proximity would confound our estimates of 
the effect of public housing concentrations: a striking 21 percent of the polling places are at or 
within 100 feet (roughly two city lots) of a public housing development in New York City. 
Although distance to polling place was measured from the election district centroid, which is not 
necessarily the center of the district population, it was consistently associated with lower turnout 
in all three elections - especially in the mayoral Democratic primary. In New York City, where 
everything is so densely packed in space, it would seem that such a slight distance would not 
matter. This is not borne out by the results.  The practical implication is clear: all other things 
being equal, highly accessible polling locations boost turnout. 
Diagnostics (LaGrange multipliers) indicated that the standard regression models left a 
great deal of spatial autocorrelation unestimated for all three election models. The spatial lag, 
introduced to estimate the net effect of turnout in neighboring districts, had a consistently 
positive effect on turnout. Across the board, a one percent increase in the weighted average of 
turnout in neighboring districts translated to about a 0.50 percent increase in the reference 
district. Moreover, in all three elections the spatial lag reduced the parameter estimates of 
almost all of the variables in the standard regression models with the exception of those for 
subsidized housing. With the exception of other subsidized housing in the Mayoral Democratic 
primary (Table 6, discussed above), public and subsidized housing continued to have a 
negative effect on turnout. (Distance to polling place estimates increased in the two general 
elections, but decreased markedly in the primary.) Explanation for this mixture of effects must 
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go beyond the measured similarities among neighboring districts, since they have already been 
controlled. As has been suggested above, social networks as well as political mobilization by 
neighborhood organizations and political clubs are likely to extend beyond the confines of a 
single election district. Whatever set of mechanisms extends the effects of turnout across 
election districts, be they social networks or partisan mobilization, they did not appear to operate 
as effectively in neighborhoods with subsidized housing in the two general elections. 
 Ecological inference estimates.  We include ecological inference estimates, although 
they are not without controversy, because they are the most widely acceptable means for 
confirming that our aggregate results reflect an underlying, individual-level phenomenon.  
Specifically, the results of the WLS models provide evidence that higher percentages of public 
and other subsidized housing have a depressive effect on district turnout levels (at least in the 
general elections), holding other district characteristics constant. Is it reasonable to interpret this 
to mean that public housing and other subsidized housing residents are less likely to vote? 
We offer some provisos before presenting the results of ecological inference models, 
however. First, ecological inference (like standard regression) assumes the independence of 
observations, which we have shown does not apply to these data. Second, in its basic form, 
ecological inference assumes that there is no aggregation bias in the phenomenon being 
analyzed (King 1997). The implication for this study is to assume that there is no correlation 
between public housing turnout and the prevalence of public housing.  We can neither confirm 
nor rule out such a relationship given the available data.  Aggregate estimates from ecological 
inference also are not readily comparable with those derived from our standard or spatial 
regression where we were able to divide housing tenure into three mutually exclusive categories 
(i.e., public housing, all other subsidized housing, and the reference group: all private market 
renters and owners). 
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Table 8 contains the aggregated turnout estimates from three ecological inference 
models. For each election, the first model shows estimated turnout for public housing residents 
versus all others; the second, other subsidized housing residents versus all others; and the 
third, all subsidized housing versus private market renters and owners.  Despite the caveats 
listed above, the aggregate estimates from ecological inference appear generally consistent 
with our previously reported findings. In the two general elections, turnout is lower in any 
subsidized housing category than in the group to which it is compared.  There was a 14 
percentage point differential in all three models for the 2000 Presidential election. The 
differential ranges from 14 to 19 percentage points in the 2001 Mayoral general election. In all 
three ecological inference models of 2001 Democratic Mayoral primary turnout, there was 
slightly lower or equivalent turnout in subsidized housing when compared to any reference 
group. Also similar to the findings of the standard and spatial regression models, the ecological 
inference estimates indicate that turnout among subsidized housing residents was more similar 
to that of private market residents in the Democratic primary than in either of the two general 
elections. 
Discussion 
In a sense, we have used measures of physical form – the incidence of units in different 
types of government-assisted housing programs – as a proxy for what we would really like to 
know – the incidence or strength of community organizations and other local institutions that 
provide the substructure for local political participation.  It would be nice to have any consistent 
and reliable measure of community organization, but, unfortunately, none presently exists.    
Possibilities include the census of non-profit organizations conducted by the Non-Profit 
Coordinating Committee, using the Real Property Assessment Data file to identify and geocode 
properties belong to religious organizations, or gathering input from informed local observers 
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about the strength or absence of tenant organizations in local housing developments.  Similarly, 
if we had some good measures across election districts of efforts by political campaigns to 
mobilize voters, that would also add considerably to our understanding of this process.  We 
encourage those who wish to understand the roles played by political institutions in mobilizing 
voters to investigate other proxies for this facet of community life, and intend to do so ourselves.  
That being said, however, it seems unlikely that any such measures would change our 
conclusion that government-assisted housing projects are not presently important sources of 
political mobilization in the poor neighborhoods of New York City. 
Despite the availability of both spatial regression and ecological inference applications, 
we are quite a way away from arriving at a statistically satisfactory approach for combining the 
advantages of both methods. The diagnostics and results of our spatial lag model indicate that 
spatial considerations are consequential to estimating turnout effects.  Although we have 
included results of ecological inference, the method has been shown to provide inaccurate 
estimates with spatially autocorrelated data (Anselin and Tam Cho 2002; Tam Cho 1998).  
While extensions of the basic ecological inference models exist to deal with other issues 
encountered in this analysis, we are aware of none to have overcome this important obstacle. 
In combination, the findings presented here provide considerable evidence that electoral 
participation is associated with contextual factors, only some of which are directly measured in 
our models. This does not suggest that individual characteristics do not affect turnout; only that 
they did not determine turnout. Neighborhood and contextual factors clearly operated differently 
in the primary election than in the two general elections. Although higher percentages of public 
and other government-assisted housing were negatively correlated with turnout in general, this 
negative association was weakened in the 2001 mayoral primary. How and to what extent did 
the candidates’ identities, their constituency bases, the issues they addressed, neighborhood 
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mobilization, or the after-effects of tenant organization explain the differences between the 
primary and general elections? The answers, which we hope to pursue through continued 
research, should help us to understand how effective various mechanisms can be at increasing 
electoral participation among traditionally low-turnout groups. 
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FIGURE 1A. Percent public housing by turnout in New York City election districts,  2000 
Presidential election  
 


























FIGURE 1B. Percent all other forms of subsidized housing by turnout in New York City 
election districts, 2000 Presidential election 
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TABLE 1. Votes Cast by Election, New York City 
 
Election Votes 
2000 Presidential Election 2,280,429 
1992 Presidential Election 2,122,392 
1993 Mayoral General Election 1,888,992 
1989 Mayoral General Election 1,864,949 
1996 Presidential Election 1,796,233 
1994 Gubernatorial Election 1,577,532 
1998 Gubernatorial Election 1,536,460 
2001 Mayoral General Election 1,480,582 
1997 Mayoral General Election 1,409,056 
1989 Democratic Mayoral Primary 1,078,482 
2001 Democratic Mayoral Primary 780,401 
1993 Democratic Mayoral Primary 497,936 
1997 Democratic Mayoral Primary 411,303 
 
Source: New York City Board of Elections, January 2002 
 
 
TABLE 2. Registered Vote by Party, New York City 
 
 Number Percent 
Registered voters 3,737,533  
Democrats 2,532,733 67.8 
Declined to Select a Party 610,439 16.3 
Republicans 475,058 12.7 
Independence Party 46,994 1.3 
Liberal Party 24,542 0.7 
Conservative Party 22,997 0.6 
Right to Life Party 10,881 0.3 
Green Party 8,534 0.2 
Working Family Party 5,355 0.1 
Female registered voters 2,122,300 56.8 
Male registered voters 1,615,259 43.2 
 
Source: New York City Board of Elections, January 2002 
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TABLE 3. Year of Most Recent Vote by Year of Registration, New York City 
 
Year of Most Recent Vote Total Year of 
Registration 
 
Pre-1996 1996-1999 2000 2001 Never  
Pre-1996 312,888 212,207 407,501 1,195,776 210,017 2,338,389 
 13.4% 9.1% 17.4% 51.1% 9.0%  
1996-1999  67,450 185,203 300,616 248,583 802,032 
  8.4% 23.1% 37.5% 31.0%  
2000   124,309 150,658 127,804 403,621 
   30.8% 37.3% 31.7%  
2001    58,605 134,872 193,571 
    30.3% 69.7%  
Total 313,297 280,331 717,054 1,705,655 721,276 3,737,613 
 8.4% 7.5% 19.2% 45.6% 19.3% 100.0% 
 
Note: Columns may not sum to total due to missing data.  
 
Source: New York City Board of Elections, January 2002.   
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TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics, variables in WLS models 
 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Turnout, 2000 presidential election 0.52 98.08 62.65 11.01 
Number registered voters 2000 1.00 2115 639.53 310.33 
Turnout, 2001 Democratic mayoral primary 0.32 84.44 30.37 8.95 
Number registered Democrats, 2001 0.00 1627 437.66 253.000 
Turnout, 2001 general election 2.17 88.46 39.86 11.514 
Number registered voters, 2001 1.00 2005 657.64 320.53 
Percent foreign born 0.00 100.00 33.54 16.40 
Percent institutional group quarters 0.00 100.00 0.84 4.19 
Percent persons under poverty level 0.00 100.00 20.53 13.84 
Percent units in buildings with 10 or more units 0.00 100.00 49.33 35.83 
Percent persons 65+ years of age 0.00 93.63 12.09 6.09 
Percent voting-age population, Hispanic 0.00 100.00 24.01 22.93 
Percent households public housing 0.00 100.00 6.22 21.02 
Percent households other subsidized 0.00 100.00 9.17 19.48 
Distance: district centroid to nearest polling place*  0.00 3.05 0.29 0.25 
 
* Measured in 1/100th’s  of a mile, or increments of 52.8 feet. 
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TABLE 5. WLS regression results: Turnout for presidential general election, 2000 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 Spatial Lag 
Constant 72.81 (.34)*** 72.67 (.34)*** 72.63 (.34)*** 73.85 (.38)*** 40.03 (2.35)*** 
Spatial lag - - - - 0.47 (.03)*** 
Size and eligibility of VAP       
Foreign born -.06 (.01)*** -0.07 (.01)*** -0.07 (.01)*** -0.07 (.01)*** -0.04 (.01)*** 
People in institutional quarters -0.21 (.03)*** -0.22 (.03)*** -0.22 (.03)*** -0.22 (.03)*** -0.19 (.02)*** 
Demographics      
People below poverty level -0.51 (.01)*** -0.49 (.01)*** -0.48 (.01)*** -0.48 (.01)*** -0.25 (.02)*** 
Units in buildings with 10+ units 0.12 (.00)*** 0.12 (.00)*** 0.12 (.00)*** 0.11 (.00)*** 0.06 (.00)*** 
Population age 65 and over -0.05 (.02)** -0.04 (.02)* -0.04 (.02)* -0.04 (.02)* 0.01 (.02) 
Hispanic voting age population -0.12 (.01)*** -0.12 (.01)*** -0.12 (.01)*** -0.12 (.01)*** -0.07 (.01)*** 
Subsidized housing      
Units in public housing - -0.03 (.00)*** -0.04 (.01)*** -0.04 (.01)*** -0.03 (.01)*** 
Units in other subsidized housing - - -0.02 (.01)*** -0.02 (.01)*** -0.01 (.00) 
Distance to polling place - - - -2.62 (.36)*** -2.71 (.38)*** 
Adjusted R2 .65 .66 .66 .66 .61† 
LaGrange Multiplier (lag) - - - 1062.97*** - 
LaGrange Multiplier (error) - - - 1026.98*** 0.07 
 Model 1: Voting age population (VAP) and demographics only 
 Model 2: VAP, demographics, and public housing 
 Model 3: VAP, demographics, and all subsidized housing 
 Model 4: VAP, demographics, subsidized housing, distance to polling place 
 †: Pseudo-R2 computed by SpaceStat 
 Note:   All predictor variables are measured as percentages except distance to polling place. 
 Unstandardized estimates reported (SE of the estimates in parentheses).  
 Significance levels: * p <= .05; ** p<=.01; *** p<=.001 
 




TABLE 6.  WLS Regression results: Turnout for Democratic Mayoral Primary, 2001 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 Spatial Lag 
Constant 28.16 (.39)** 28.01 (.39)*** 28.04 (.39)*** 30.72 (.42)*** 15.41 (1.9)*** 
Spatial lag - - - - 0.53 (.06)*** 
Size and eligibility of VAP       
Foreign born -0.07 (.01)*** -0.08 (.01)*** -0.08 (.01)*** -.0.08 (.01) *** -0.04 (.01)*** 
People in institutional quarters -0.28 (.03)*** -0.29 (.03)*** -0.30 (.03)*** -0.30 (.03) *** -0.11 (.02)*** 
Demographics      
People below poverty level -0.19 (.01)*** -0.16 (.01)*** -0.17 (.01)*** -0.18 (.01) *** -0.10 (.01)*** 
Units in buildings with 10+ units 0.08 (.00)*** 0.08 (.00)*** 0.08 (.00)*** -0.07 (.00) *** 0.03 (.01)*** 
Population age 65 and over 0.36 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.38 (.02)*** 0.37 (.02) *** 0.18 (.02)*** 
Hispanic voting age population 0.02 (.01)*** 0.02 (.01)*** 0.02 (.01)*** 0.02 (.01) *** 0.00 (.01) 
Subsidized housing      
Units in public housing - -.03 (.01)*** -.03 (.01)*** -0.03 (.01) *** -0.01 (.01) 
Units in other subsidized housing - - 0.01 (.01) 0.00 (.01) 0.02 (.01)** 
Distance to polling place - - - -6.27 (.41)*** -4.65 (.42)*** 
Adjusted R2 .30 .31 .31 .33 .34† 
LaGrange Multiplier (lag) - - - 1522.46*** - 
LaGrange Multiplier (error) - - - 1580.26*** 0.07 
 
 Model 1: Voting age population (VAP) and demographics only 
 Model 2: VAP, demographics, and public housing 
 Model 3: VAP, demographics, and all subsidized housing 
 Model 4: VAP, demographics, subsidized housing, distance to polling place 
 †: Pseudo-R2 computed by SpaceStat 
 Note: All predictor variables are measured as percentages except distance to polling place. 
 Unstandardized estimates reported (SE of the estimates in parentheses).  
 Significance levels: * p <= .05; ** p<=.01; *** p<=.001 
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TABLE 7. WLS Regression results: Turnout for Mayoral general election, 2001 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 Spatial Lag 
Constant 45.90 (.35)*** 45.74 (.35)*** 45.65 (.35)*** 46.82 (.39)*** 25.57 (1.42)*** 
Spatial lag - - - - 0.48 (.03) *** 
Size and eligibility of VAP       
Foreign born -0.09 (.01)*** -0.10 (.01)*** -0.11 (.01)*** -0.11 (.01)*** -0.06 (.01) *** 
People in institutional quarters -0.34 (.03)*** -0.35 (.03)*** -0.34 (.03)*** -0.35 (.03)*** -0.17 (.02) *** 
Demographics      
People below poverty level -0.45 (.01)*** -0.42 (.01)*** -0.40 (.01)*** -0.40 (.01)*** -0.20 (.01) *** 
Units in buildings with 10+ units 0.07 (.00)*** 0.06 (.00)*** 0.06 (.00)*** 0.06 (.00)*** 0.02 (.00) *** 
Population age 65 and over 0.44 (.02)*** 0.45 (.02)*** 0.46 (.02)*** 0.45 (.02)*** 0.26 (.02) *** 
Hispanic voting age population -0.10 (.01)*** -0.10 (.01)*** -0.10 (.01)*** -0.10 (.01)*** -0.07 (.01) *** 
Subsidized housing      
Units in public housing - -0.04 (.00)*** -0.05 (.01)*** -0.05 (.01)*** -0.04 (.00) *** 
Units in other subsidized housing - - -0.04 (.01)*** -0.04 (.01)*** -0.02 (.00) *** 
Distance to polling place - - - -2.56 (.37)*** -3.12 (.37) *** 
Adjusted R2 .67 .67 .67 .68 .65† 
LaGrange Multiplier (lag) - - - 1665.66*** - 
LaGrange Multiplier (error) - - - 1703.02*** 2.54 
 Model 1: Voting age population (VAP) and demographics only 
 Model 2: VAP, demographics, and public housing 
 Model 3: VAP, demographics, and all subsidized housing 
 Model 4: VAP, demographics, subsidized housing, distance to polling place 
 †: Pseudo-R2 computed by SpaceStat 
 Note All predictor variables are measured as percentages except distance to polling place. 
 Unstandardized estimates reported (SE of the estimates in parentheses).  
 Significance levels: * p <= .05; ** p<=.01; *** p<=.001 
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TABLE 8. Aggregate estimates from ecological inference, New York City 2000 and 2001 
elections 
      





Public housing 50.5% 28.0% 26.3%  
All other 64.0% 31.1% 40.7% 
Subsidized other than public housing 49.9% 30.2% 22.7%  
All other 64.4% 30.9% 41.5% 
Public and all other subsidized housing 51.2% 29.2% 25.6%  
Private market 65.5% 31.2% 42.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
